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The Impact of the Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan on Russia’s Security  
Patr i ck Nopens 
ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
2014 will directly impact the wider 
region. Not only is there a risk of 
instability spilling over to Central Asia, 
but the drawdown will also accelerate the 
ongoing shift in the balance of power in 
Central Asia towards China. Should a 
spillover occur, the burden will mainly 
fall on Russia and China. Russia will, 
however, only continue playing the 
dominant role in the security of the 
former Soviet Central Asia (FSCA) until 
China takes on responsibility for the 
security of its direct sphere of influence 
or “dingwei”. Russia’s Near Abroad, 
however, overlaps both with the EU’s 
Eastern Neighbourhood in Europe and 
China’s dingwei in Central Asia and the 
Far East. It is, therefore, necessary to 
approach Russian reactions to these 
encroachments on its historical spheres 
of influence in a single context, taking 
into account the interrelationship 
between these three. 
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A WITHDRAWAL WITH A WIDER IMPACT  
In 2014, the International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) will draw to an 
end. ISAF is playing a key role in degrading 
the Taliban's operational capabilities. 
Moreover, it is building up the Afghan 
Security Forces to enable Kabul to assume 
responsibility of security after ISAF's 
departure. However, these achievements are 
fragile and reversible, and can only be 
consolidated if they are accompanied by 
additional and lasting reforms.  
 
The drawdown will not only affect 
Afghanistan but also the wider region and 
Russia’s overall security. This brief begins with 
addressing the problems arising in Afghanistan 
as a consequence of the withdrawal. Secondly, 
it examines two opposing threat assessments 
of the risk of a spillover of instability from 
Afghanistan to Central Asia. Thirdly, it 
attempts to put the consequences of the 
withdrawal in an Afghan and a regional 
context. Fourth, it contends that the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan is accelerating 
the shift of the balance of power in Central 
Asia in favour of China. Fifth, it explores the 
options for Russia to adapt to the changing 
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geostrategic situation in Central Asia. Sixth, it 
examines Russia’s position in Central Asia in 
the wider context of its overall security policy. 
Finally, it concludes that the shift in the 
balance of power in Central Asia has a direct 
impact on Russia’s geopolitical position, not 
only in the FSCA, but also in Europe and the 
Far East. 
 
LEAVING AFGHANISTAN 
The situation in Afghanistan is far from 
stabilised. In the north and the west, the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
should be able to control the insurgency after 
the withdrawal. By contrast, in the south and 
the east, serious fighting will continue without 
any prospect of Kabul gaining the upper hand 
within any reasonable time frame.1  
 
The surge of 2010-2012 aimed at pacifying 
Afghanistan by delivering a debilitating blow 
to the Taliban and driving them out of key 
areas. Simultaneously, the ANSF was to be 
trained and equipped to safeguard stability 
after the coalition had all but destroyed the 
Taliban. However, the surge did not 
accomplish its goals. Moreover, training a large 
security force from scratch in a short time has 
yet to yield results. The ANSF will have to 
carry out major operations instead of mopping 
up the remnants of the insurgency. It is 
unlikely that they will be able to defeat the 
Taliban. War will probably continue as long as 
donors fund the ANSF. This will lead to a 
stalemate until patience and interest of the US 
and its partners with Afghanistan runs out.2 
Instability in Afghanistan will continue as long 
as no political solution is reached.  
 
This will be all the more difficult as the 
position of the future president is uncertain. 
Vote rigging, intimidation, bribing, and a lack 
of transparency characterised the 2009 
elections. President Karzai has no natural 
successor. Most candidates for next year's 
elections are controversial and participated in 
the civil war before 1996. This does not bode 
well for the legitimacy and future of his 
successor. 
 
Any peace settlement will also have to take 
into account the interests of all parties, the 
Taliban included. Pakistan lays claim to an 
important degree of influence over the central 
government. Other countries, like Iran and 
bordering states of the FSCA, want to control 
parts of the country to support their ethnic kin. 
Still others will want economic concessions.3 
The question is in how far all parties want 
genuinely to engage in a peace process. 
 
THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DIMENSION  
Afghanistan's security will remain dependent 
on the presence of ISAF follow-on forces 
post-2014. In January 2013, the commander of 
ISAF, General Alan, identified three options 
for a residual presence of US troops in 
Afghanistan.4 A first option of about 6,000 
troops would focus on counter-terrorism 
missions; a second option of about 10,000 
soldiers would also include training, mentoring, 
and logistical support; in a third option of 
20,000 troops, US troops would also be able to 
patrol some areas. The American 
Administration floated a zero-option in July, 
due to rising tensions with President Karzai. 
American policy makers and military 
authorities quickly labelled this not a realistic 
option.5 However, it could be reconsidered if 
no agreement on a security pact is reached by 
the end of 2013.  
 
The most likely scenario is a small force of 
about 10,000, reinforced by smaller 
contributions of allies. This would allow for 
protecting American bases for special 
operations, some limited support to the ANSF, 
as well as some training and mentoring. In any 
event, once the US-led coalition draws down, a 
power vacuum will result, which will somehow 
have to be filled. Some regional powers will 
most likely step in to assert their influence in 
Afghanistan.6 
 
 3 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
Russia has little influence over the internal 
political process of Afghanistan and is a 
modest aid and development donor. It has 
been frequently involved in Afghanistan, most 
prominently during the Soviet intervention in 
the eighties. The "Afghan syndrome" caused by 
this fiasco still influences Russia's perceptions 
of Afghanistan. In any event, Russia does have 
every interest in a political solution as a 
prerequisite to tackle the drug problem and 
instability.  
 
THE REGIONAL DIMENSION  
The players affected by the withdrawal can be 
represented as a set of concentric circles, 
taking into account the level of interests and 
leverage each actor has.7  
 
The neighbours 
Pakistan and Iran constitute a first tier. 
Pakistan wields excessive influence in 
Afghanistan, exerting leverage on Jihadist 
groups inside and outside Afghanistan as well 
as on politicians, local authorities, and business 
people. Iran's influence is chiefly present north 
of the Hindu Kush. However, Pashtuns and 
the more secular Uzbeks are weary of Iran's 
influence.8 
 
Taking into account the influence both 
countries wield within Afghanistan, any 
comprehensive peace agreement will have to 
accommodate key legitimate concerns of both 
Pakistan and Iran as the most relevant regional 
stakeholders. 
 
The reg ional powers  
A second circle consists of China, India, the 
states of the FSCA, and Russia. China and 
India are the most influential players.  
 
China still keeps a relatively low political 
profile but is a main economic player and 
investor. For the present, it is mainly interested 
in Afghanistan as part of its resource base. 
China is investing heavily in resource 
extraction such as copper and oil. In the longer 
term, China sees Afghanistan as a pawn in its 
rivalry with India, completing a series of 
alliances with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. In the meantime, China keeps its 
options open, even supporting the Taliban to a 
certain extent, hoping to expedite US 
disengagement from Afghanistan and Central 
Asia.9 
 
India looks upon Afghanistan in the context of 
its rivalry with Pakistan, and to a lesser degree 
with China, but it also recognises substantial 
economic potential. It wants to avoid the 
return of a Pakistan-aligned government in 
Kabul, which uses Afghan soil to prepare 
terrorist attacks on India. India has traditionally 
had excellent relations with the Afghan 
government, except with the Taliban. Delhi has 
given Afghanistan $2 billion in aid during the 
last decade, making it the fourth largest donor. 
Contrary to Pakistan, India has engaged the 
Afghan military and trains Afghan officers. 
 
Russia, has been the most influential player in 
Central Asia for more than a century and a 
half, but recognises that the region has become 
multipolar. After 2001, Russia deliberately 
chose to adopt a low profile in Afghanistan, 
not cultivating local actors until 2006. From 
2006 to 2009, Russia supported northern 
groups, hoping they would bring pressure to 
bear on Karzai to adopt a policy more 
independent from the Americans. Russia 
retreated when this approach misfired and 
became redundant as Karzai and the 
Americans had more and more fallouts. Its 
proposals for cooperation in security matters 
and involvement in rebuilding old Soviet 
infrastructure were rejected. Most 
disappointing for the Russians, however, is the 
failure to have the Afghans and ISAF 
implement a more vigorous anti-narcotic 
programme.10 
 
The main way Afghanistan relates to the FSCA 
is through their concern for a spillover of 
instability post-2014. Also, the countries of 
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Central Asia, once mainly transit avenues for 
Afghan drugs, have become major consumers. 
  
The outs ide powers  
Stakeholders that are not part of the region 
make up the third category.  
 
America maintains a full geopolitical agenda in 
Central Asia. The US has always been at the 
forefront of unlocking Central Asian 
hydrocarbons, circumventing Russia. Most 
importantly, the US will want to play a role in 
the rebalancing of power in Central Asia. 
Concerning Afghanistan, it hopes to retain a 
reduced military presence. Both American and 
Afghan demands held up the arduous 
negotiations of a security agreement on the 
scope of the US military mission in Afghanistan 
post-2014. On 24 November a Loya Jirga 
endorsed a deal. However, Karzai decided to 
postpone the signing of the agreement until after 
next year’s elections. Karzai seems to have 
entered a game of brinkmanship based on the 
conviction that the US needs this agreement at 
all cost. The US is threatening to pull out 
completely after 2014 if the agreement is not 
signed by the end of 2013.  
 
The EU will remain present in Afghanistan and 
the FSCA post-2014. EU countries may stay 
militarily involved post-ISAF if the US does so. 
Also, the EU and Afghanistan are finalising a 
Cooperation Agreement for Partnership and 
Development (CAPD). EU countries donate more 
than one billion USD yearly.  It is also training 
the Afghan National Police and supports rural 
development, agriculture, health care, 
governance, border control, and counter-
narcotic activities.11 The EU is also extending its 
relations with the FSCA. The EU Strategy for a 
New Partnership with Central Asia includes 
reinforcement of political dialogue, human 
rights, education, rule of law, energy, transport, 
water, border management, and trade and 
economic relations.12 
 
Turkey's presence in Afghanistan transcends its 
role as a NATO ally. Its primary goal is to 
strengthen relations with Turkic ethnic groups 
in the region. However, Turkey also has close 
historical, religious and cultural links with 
Afghanistan.13 Turkey and Afghanistan signed 
a memorandum of understanding in 2011 on 
"Cooperation on Energy and Mineral Resources", a 
first of its kind. Turkey also holds diplomatic 
cards complementing traditional Western 
influence in the region. Since 2007, Turkey 
takes part in an annual trilateral summit with 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkey is, as only 
NATO ally, a dialogue partner of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In January 
2010, Turkey hosted the Istanbul Summit for 
Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia to 
find sustainable solutions for security and 
stability in Afghanistan.  
 
Arab countries also have interests in 
Afghanistan through their religious links and 
their diplomatic efforts to come to a political 
solution. 
 
The mult inat ional f ramework 
Finally, multilateral regional frameworks 
constitute a fourth layer. These have some 
influence, but national interests and direct 
deals often take precedence.14 Regarding 
Russia, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) and the SCO are of 
particular importance. Furthermore, Russia 
maintains bilateral relations with each of the 
states of the FSCA and is part of 
institutionalised frameworks such as the 
Dushanbe Quartet (Russia, Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan and Pakistan). Finally, the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime is of particular 
interest to Russia because of its involvement in 
counter-narcotic issues. 
 
The CSTO, as a Russia-led collective defence 
organisation, is the most obvious instrument 
for coordinating Russia’s security response to 
an eventual spillover with allies from the 
FSCA. However, so far the CSTO can only 
operate on the territory of its member states.15 
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As Turkmenistan is not a member, and 
Uzbekistan suspended its membership in 2012, 
the SCO can only effectively confront the threat 
in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
However, it does legally bind Russia to the 
security of its Central Asian allies. 
 
Likewise, member states of the SCO worry 
about future developments in Afghanistan.16 Of 
Afghanistan's neighbours, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and China are members of the SCO. 
Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are observers 
and Turkmenistan attends as guest. Since 2003, 
military exercises take place under the auspices 
of the SCO, comprising chiefly of troops from 
China and Russia. The SCO also established a 
permanent Regional Antiterrorist Structure to 
increase cooperation to combat terrorism, 
separatism and extremism. 
 
SPILLOVER AND SHIFTING BALANCE OF 
POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Spil lover? 
The withdrawal is causing considerable concerns 
about security in the broader region. On one 
hand, there are real or perceived threats of 
spillover of terrorism, Islamic extremism, 
separatism, and narcotic-related crime into 
Central Asia. On the other hand, the 
disengagement of the US from Afghanistan and 
Central Asia is accelerating the rise of China in 
the FSCA at the expense of Russia.  
 
If these risks of spillover will develop into actual 
threats, remains to be seen. There is no general 
agreement about the scale of the threat to the 
stability of an already volatile Central Asia. Two 
opposite narratives exist about the impact of a 
withdrawal.17 The Afghan and Western 
governments claim that Afghanistan will be 
capable of guaranteeing its own security, 
provided the West does continue to support 
Kabul. According to this view, there is no 
significant risk of spillover to the region. 
Conversely, the states of the FSCA and Russia, 
and regional international organisations such as 
the CSTO and, to a lesser degree, the SCO, 
predict a serious spillover into neighbouring 
countries and beyond.18 
 
Should these risks materialise, the first victims 
would be the states of the FSCA, but the 
burden of countering them would fall primarily 
on Russia and China.  
 
China's main concerns are insurrection 
spreading to Uighur separatists and instability 
in the FSCA, substantially raising the cost of 
integrating the region in its resource base. 
 
Russia's main concerns are instability in the 
FSCA spreading to the Russian Federation and 
drug trafficking. Russia's initial acceptance of 
the US and NATO's involvement in 
Afghanistan rested on the expectation that the 
West would defeat the Taliban, withdraw from 
the region rapidly, and owe a debt for 
Moscow’s help in getting access to supply 
routes through the FSCA.19 None of these 
hopes materialised. Moreover, whereas the US 
and ISAF tied down and wore down the 
Taliban and its supporters for more than a 
decade in Afghanistan, after 2014, Afghanistan 
could become a source of spreading terrorism, 
separatism, and Islam fundamentalism. 
 
The threat perceptions between the various 
states of the FSCA differ significantly. 
Insurgents of the Islamic Movement of Turkestan 
(IMT) are infiltrating Tajikistan and appear to 
have reached Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan does not 
seem affected yet, but most members of the 
IMT are Uzbek. Turkmenistan has managed to 
stay neutral and even maintained close 
relations with the Taliban emirate. It hopes to 
remain on close terms with whomever 
ultimately gets into power in Kabul. Even 
Kazakhstan, hitherto the most stable country 
in the region, has seen a surge in Islamic 
extremism and terrorism since 2011. Finally, 
the looming transition of leadership in 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan could 
make the region even more volatile and open 
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to extremism. 
 
The withdrawal will render the fight against 
narcotics originating from Afghanistan even 
more difficult.20 Afghanistan not only produces 
over 90 percent of the world’s opiates, it also is 
the main producer of cannabis. Afghan opiates 
kill 100,000 people a year globally. Narcotics are 
a serious threat to the FSCA, already turning 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into narco-states. In 
Russia, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people die 
of drug overdoses annually. If Afghanistan also 
turns into a narco-state, this would exacerbate 
the drug problem in Russia as well as in the 
FSCA.  
 
The FSCA: from Russia’s  near abroad to 
China’s  direc t  sphere o f  in f luence  
The drawdown of the Western intervention in 
Afghanistan and its effects on the region cannot 
be seen in isolation from the ongoing shift of 
the balance of power in Central Asia. The FSCA 
remained up to recently firmly in the grip of 
Russia. After the US making inroads in the 
region, chiefly for security reasons, China is now 
penetrating Central Asia in a more permanent 
fashion. For the time being, China is focussing 
on extracting resources, marketing its 
commodities, and building infrastructure linking 
its Eastern provinces to the region. 
 
Until recently, Russia dominated the energy 
infrastructure and markets unlocking the 
region's energy resources. It rather successfully 
fended off the West's attempts to achieve energy 
independence through circumventing Russia's 
pipeline grid. Now, however, China is rapidly 
breaking Russia's stranglehold over Central 
Asian energy exports. In a remarkably short 
period, China has managed to build a pipeline 
system, which is independent of Russia. 
 
Moreover, Chinese interests in the FSCA also 
extend to uranium, ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals, hydroelectricity, transport infrastructure, 
and telecommunications. China's trade with the 
region has grown to $46 billion in 2012, 
compared to $88 billion with Russia. During 
President Xi Jingpin visit in September 2013 to 
the FSCA, China pledged nearly $100 billion in 
energy contracts. $50 billion will go to 
Turkmenistan, $30 billion to Kazakhstan, $15 
billion to Uzbekistan, and $1.5 to 3 billion to 
Kyrgyzstan.21 
 
China's push into the region is not purely 
economic. It is an integrated geopolitical 
approach, combining "zhoubian zhengce" 
(periphery policy), "mulin zhengce" (good 
neighbouring policy), and “wending zhoubian” 
(stabilising the periphery). China considers the 
FSCA as part of its direct sphere of influence 
or "dingwei". Security is part of this integrated 
approach even though, for the time being, 
China concentrates on economic penetration 
while freeloading with regard to security on the 
US in the Persian Gulf and Russia in the 
FSCA.22 China’s growing clout in Central Asia 
is also changing the wider geopolitical 
equation. China’s imports and exports at 
present move over sea routes controlled by the 
American Navy. Land routes to Central Asia 
and to the Russian Far East will give it access 
to raw materials and export markets free from 
American interference. 
 
This confronts Russia with a triple challenge. 
Russia identifies three "directions of risk"; 
NATO in the West, Islam extremism in the 
South, and demographic emptiness in the 
Russian Far East.23 These are the regions 
where Russia’s near abroad overlaps with the 
EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and China's dingwei. 
 
OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA 
It would be naïve to assume that China only 
has economic and no geopolitical ambitions. 
This pushes Russia to review its ambitions in 
Central Asia. The past 25 years, Russia has 
fluctuated between retreat and new imperial 
ambition, while, at the same time, initiating 
multilateral cooperation.  
 
On one hand, the agreement in December 
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1990 between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, 
and Belarus to dissolve the Soviet Union 
without consulting their Central Asian 
colleagues, signalled a radical retreat from the 
region, which the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States could not 
gloss over. A further indication of 
disengagement was the decision in 2004 to 
remove the Russian border guards from the 
Tajik-Afghan border. Russia's refusal in 2010 to 
intervene in the riots in Kyrgyzstan, once again 
demonstrated its reluctance to get involved on 
the ground.  
 
On the other hand, other actions demonstrate 
Russia's continuing interest in Central Asia.24 
Until recently, Russia controlled all the pipelines 
unlocking the hydrocarbon resources of the 
region. In 2001, it initially showed considerable 
reluctance to support the deployment of 
American assets to Afghanistan by way of the 
FSCA. It retains military bases in Tajikistan and 
is expanding its military presence in 
Kyrgyzstan.25 Russia has moulded the CSTO 
into an instrument to coordinate security forces 
in the FSCA under its control. Moscow is also 
trying to retain Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan in its political and economic orbit 
through the Eurasian Union and the Eurasian 
Economic Union. These organisations are not 
only aimed at diminishing Western influence, 
but are also anti-Chinese projects, trying to 
forestall China's rise in the region.  
 
Until recently Russia’s policy was to maximise its 
influence in the entire region through pushing 
for economic and security integration under its 
leadership. Currently, however, Russia seems to 
be focussing on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. Kazakhstan remains Russia’s 
privileged partner, mainly because of its location, 
large ethnic Russian minority, and an economy 
largely oriented towards Russia.26 Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan are still deeply dependent on 
Russia. Turkmenistan, by contrast, is growing 
ever closer to China. Over the last fifteen years, 
Uzbekistan has been changing tack regularly, 
once leaning toward Russia, and then aligning 
itself with the US. Moreover, Russia is 
demonstrating a new willingness to get 
involved in Afghan affairs after 2014.27   
 
THE ROLE OF CENTRAL ASIA IN 
RUSSIA’S OVERALL SECURITY POLICY 
Russia’s position in Central Asia cannot be 
seen in isolation from the interrelationship 
between the three strategic directions of its 
security posture. 
 
Focusing on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan does not guarantee long-term 
influence in the region. Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are rapidly being pulled into China’s 
economic orbit. The northern, ethnically 
Russian part of Kazakhstan, seems to be the 
only part of the FSCA where Russia has a 
perspective of retaining a dominant influence 
in the longer term. 
 
China is not only making significant inroads in 
the FSCA; it is also steadily encroaching upon 
the Russian Far East, and even Eastern 
Siberia.28 Ultimately, this will lead to tensions 
with China. While Russian and Chinese 
interests coincide for the time being, it is China 
that poses the greatest threat to Russia’s 
territorial integrity and influence in its southern 
and eastern strategic directions. In a contest 
with China, Russia is in a fragile position, 
chiefly because of the demographic emptiness 
of its territory, “almost beckoning Chinese 
colonisation”.29 Russia, therefore, has to try and 
expand its demographic base. This confronts 
Russia with an existential problem. 
 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union not 
only shed off those parts considered a liability, 
but also split up the three Slavic components 
of the Empire, leaving a quarter of the Slavic 
population outside of Russia. Without Ukraine 
and Belarus, Russia does not possess the 
indispensable demographic base to compete 
with the US, the EU, China, and other 
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upcoming powers. Without Ukraine and Belarus, 
Russia’s is but a medium power on the eastern 
fringe of Europe. As the former American 
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in 
the mid-nineties, “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to 
be an empire, but with Ukraine, suborned and then 
subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an 
empire.”30 Hence, the unacceptability for Russia 
of these countries drifting toward the West and 
the urgency of consolidating a union of some 
sort before tensions with China turn acute. 
 
This is equally true for the Russian Far East and 
Central Asia: if Russia loses its Far East with its 
access to the Pacific, control of the Northern 
Sea Route, and vast resources, or loses foothold 
in Central Asia, it will not be able to claim to be 
a Eurasian power anymore. With rising tensions 
with China on the horizon, Russia has to secure 
its position in Europe and its presence in Central 
Asia. For the time being, this leads Russia into a 
confrontational approach towards the West 
while avoiding altercations with China. 
 
CONCLUSION   
In the short term, Russia will remain the leading 
security provider in the FSCA after ISAF’s 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, in the 
longer term, it will have to give way to China in 
most of Central Asia once this country takes on 
its responsibilities for the security of its 
periphery and resource base. 
It is essential to keep in mind that Russia’s 
three strategic directions are interdependent. 
In order to regain the status of a major power, 
Russia has to augment its demographic base. 
To achieve this Ukraine and Belarus have to 
return in the fold of some kind of formal 
Russian dominated union. Likewise, without 
keeping a foothold in Central Asia and 
securing its Far East, Russia will remain a 
medium sized power. These prerequisites to 
regain major power status harbour the germ of 
future conflict in Russia’s three strategic 
directions. 
 
Finally, a combination of China’s population 
and the resources of Siberia and Central Asia 
will be unacceptable, not only for Russia, but 
also for other major powers. Therefore, how 
Russia stands up to these challenges in the 
coming decade, and how the West acts, will 
determine the new balance of power. 
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